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Abstract 
This paper investigates stock market reaction to debt arrangements in Russia. The analysis of 
the valuation of debt arrangements by stock markets provides information about the use of 
debt by Russian companies. We apply the event study methodology to check whether debt 
announcements lead to abnormal returns using a sample of Russian listed companies that 
issued syndicated loans or bonds between  June 2004 and  December 2008. We find a 
negative reaction of stock markets to debt arrangements that can be explained by moral 
hazard behavior of shareholders at the expense of debtholders. Further, we observe no 
significant difference between announcements of syndicated loans and bonds. Thus, our 
findings support the view that Russian companies could  have incentives to limit their 
reliance on external debt. 
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1. Introduction 
It  is well-demonstrated in the literature that the presence of efficient  financial 
intermediaries and stock markets contributes to economic growth by favoring access to 
financing sources. As a result, a consensus has emerged that development of the financial 
sector is positive for economic growth (Levine, 2005). 
Given this insight, we postulate that the  lack of development of Russia’s  financial 
system  might constitute an obstacle to the country’s economic development. Indeed, 
despite  substantial GDP growth since 2000, Russia’s  financial system in 2007 remained 
dwarfish by international standards with a mere 32% ratio of private credit provided by 
financial institutions to GDP compared to a world average of nearly 55%.
1
The financing problems of Russian companies reflect the underdevelopment of its 
financial system generally, and Russia’s financial markets in particular. Rosstat figures show 
bank credit was used to finance only 11% of investments in 2008, and with the exception of 
a few major IPOs, companies largely refrained from equity issues to finance investment. In 
2007, for instance, only about 2% of investments were financed through equity issues.  
 
While the strong dependence of Russian companies on internal sources of funds is 
arguably a consequence of limited access to external funds, a case could also be made that 
the relatively modest reliance on bank credit might be the result of demand factors, and,  
that Russian companies actually have incentives to avoid external financing. Indeed, the 
pecking-order theory provides justifications for the priority use of internal financing, owing 
notably to the greater cost of external financing sources which is a result of information 
asymmetries in favor of managers.
2
To better understand the use of debt by Russian companies, we analyze the valuation 
of debt arrangements by stock markets. A negative reaction of stock markets would suggest 
that debt arrangements are negatively perceived by investors in Russia  and thus unlike 
 Thus, the importance of retained earnings for Russian 
companies may very well be the product of their preference for internal funds.  
                                                           
1 These figures come from the update of Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000) dataset released in 2009. 
2 Delcoure (2007) provides support for the priority use of internal financing in Central and Eastern European 
countries. 3 
 
developed countries Russian firms may have reasons to avoid debt financing. This appears, 
at least potentially, to be a valid explanation of limited use of debt. By the same token, a 
positive reaction of stock markets would indicate voluntary avoidance of debt-taking  by 
Russian companies. 
To investigate the stock market reactions to debt arrangements in Russia, we apply the 
event study methodology. This allows us to measure the impact of a specific economic event 
on the  stock price  and  the  firm’s  valuation. We then look to see whether debt 
announcements by Russian companies lead to abnormal returns by considering a sample of 
Russian listed companies that issued 38 syndicated loans and 17 bonds between June 2004 
and December 2008. 
Our contribution to the literature is two-fold. First, this is the first study we are aware 
of that applies the event study methodology Russia. It contributes to the modest literature 
on stock markets in Russia (Rockinger and Urga, 2000; Anatolyev, 2005). Second, we extend 
the literature on stock market reactions to debt announcements by providing the analysis of 
stock market reactions to announcements of both syndicated loans and bonds. Former 
papers analyze the reaction to the announcement of a specific type of debt instrument (e.g. 
Gasbarro et al., 2004, for loans and Miller and Puthenpurackal, 2005, for bonds). As both 
instruments are used in financing large debt arrangements, we also analyze whether the 
type of debt instrument might induce different stock market reactions such that the choice 
of debt instrument was important for a particular situation. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides literature overview 
and  discusses testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes  the most important features 
concerning financing sources for Russian companies. Section 4 presents the sample and the 




In this section, we survey the relevant corporate finance literature on stock market reactions 
to external debt financing, and discuss the main testable hypotheses related to stock market 
perception of debt arrangements. 
2.1 Literature review 
Our research ties into several strands of existing literature. The first strand deals with stock 
market reactions to bank debt announcements. Starting with the seminal works of 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and James (1987), research in this area has mostly found a 
positive impact of bank debt announcements on stock prices. A common explanation here is 
that banks play a unique role as information transmitters in capital markets  (i.e.  banks 
possess a competitive advantage in evaluating borrowers, so  obtaining a bank loan is 
considered to be a positive signal of the prospective borrower’s creditworthiness to other 
market participants). Lummer and McConnell (1989) extend this analysis by distinguishing 
new bank loans and loan renewals for US borrowers. They find positive and significant 
abnormal  return only for loan renewals, confirming  that loan renewal serves as a 
certification device for the quality of the borrower. Aintablian and Roberts (2000) confirm 
more  positive effects for loan renewals in their analysis of Canadian bank loan 
announcements. In addition to loan renewals other characteristics are found to contribute 
to larger abnormal returns. Slovin et al. (1992) show that positive impact of bank 
announcements concerns primarily small firms. Furthermore, as evidenced by Billett et al. 
(1995) higher quality lenders contribute to larger abnormal borrower returns. More recent 
results  based on  Japanese data suggest that the positive valuation effect of bank loan 
announcements for borrowing firms is mainly due to a wealth transfer from lending banks 
(Kang and Liu, 2008). 
As most studies on this topic pertain to developed countries
3
                                                           
3 The exception is a study by Bailey et al. (2010) who use Chinese bank loan announcements and find negative 
abnormal returns for borrowers with frequent related-party transactions, poor subsequent performance, high 
state ownership, no foreign class shares, loans from the four state banks, loans from local bank branches, or 
loans intended to repay existing debt. 
, it is hardly unreasonable 
to wonder how stock markets react in emerging countries. We might, for example, see a 5 
 
higher cost of debt relative to internal financing in emerging countries than in developed 
ones, which, in turn, could lead to a negative reaction of stock markets following debt 
announcements. Cost of debt, after all, reflects agency costs between shareholders and 
debtholders that can lead to moral hazard on the part of shareholders. This could be more 
pronounced in emerging countries with  weaker institutional frameworks  to protect 
debtholders. 
The second strand of literature involves studies of the Russian stock market. Despite 
the economic boom that got underway in 2000, there has been surprisingly little academic 
study of Russia’s  stock market. Fortunately,  we find a number of solid works on the 
efficiency of stock markets in Russia (Rockinger and Urga, 2000; Abrosimova et al., 2002; 
Anatolyev, 2005). All these papers argue for increased efficiency of Russian stock markets. 
We contribute to this literature with our novel application of event study methodology in a 
Russian context. 
The third strand concerns comparison of the stock market reaction to the 
announcement of two different debt instruments: a bond and a syndicated loan. Both 
instruments are used to finance large debt arrangements. We ask whether the stock markets 
react differently to these  financing instruments as this could help in  assessing  the 
motivations of Russian companies. 
The preferences for one debt instrument over another can be summarized as follows: 
(1) Stock markets confer a higher value to syndicated loans as they are less costly in terms of 
origination fees and act to certify the creditworthiness of borrower.  (2) Bonds  may be 
preferred by stock market participants  as  they  are  typically  harder to renegotiate  and 
markets find it easier to evaluate their quality.  
Several  studies  analyze  the impact of syndicated loan announcements confirming 
positive stock market reaction (e.g. Preece and Mullineaux, 1996; Gasbarro et al., 2004), 
while other studies examine the corresponding effect of bond issue announcements (e.g. 
Eckbo, 1986; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1999; Miller and Puthenpurackal, 2005) and find 
mixed results. Altunbas et al. (2009) investigate the financial characteristics that influence 
the choice of a European firm between raising funds through syndicated loan market and 6 
 
corporate bond market. They find that larger, more profitable, highly leveraged firms with 
fewer growth opportunities prefer syndicated loans over bonds. We are not aware of any 




Previous studies of stock  market reaction to debt announcements provide evidence of 
differing  reactions.  We offer two hypotheses to explain the positive reaction of stock 
markets.  
First, the issuance of debt is a positive signal, helping to solve adverse selection which 
results from information asymmetries between firm insiders and outsiders. Indeed, debt is 
used by high-quality firms to show their quality (Leland and Pyle, 1977). Notably, Ross (1977) 
advanced the notion that a high-quality firm can issue more debt than a low-quality firm, 
because the issuance of debt leads to a higher probability of default due to debt-servicing 
costs. Such an outcome can be very costly to firm insiders. Thus, debt is perceived as a 
credible signal as to the quality of a  firm. This signaling role is especially important in 
countries with greater ex ante information asymmetries. Indeed, there is evidence for this 
for Russian syndicated loans (Fungáčová, Godlewski and Weill, 2011), although it should be 
noted that this finding pertains to a period when Russia’s bond market was just emerging 
and alternative sources of funding were scarce. 
Second, agency costs resulting from conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
managers can be reduced through issuance of debt. The problem  is the moral hazard 
behavior on the part of managers when their objectives differ from those of the firm. Bad 
managers can waste firm resources or deliberately minimize their efforts rather than focus 
on increasing firm value. Debt financing increases the pressure on managers to perform (i.e. 
stop wasting company resources and increase their effort) by restricting the “free cash-flow” 
at the disposal of managers (Jensen, 1986). Debt implies interest payment obligations that 
must be satisfied by managers; they might face bankruptcy if their firm’s debt obligations are 
not satisfied. Grossman and Hart (1982) further argue that debt financing provides strong 
incentive for managers to perform in the firm’s interests as otherwise they face personal 7 
 
costs related to the firm’s bankruptcy. As a consequence, issuance of debt can be considered 
a positive signal for firm performance and could be anticipated to lead to a positive reaction 
of stock markets. 
The counterargument as to why we might expect stock markets to react negatively to 
debt events is based on the agency costs resulting from the conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and debtholders. Shareholders are tempted to take actions that benefit 
themselves at the expense of debtholders and do not maximize firm value. This divergence 
of interests manifests itself in two forms of moral hazard. First, it gives incentives to 
shareholders to invest in riskier projects than those preferred by debtholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Such  “asset substitution” comes from the asymmetry of  gains for 
shareholders. Second, as demonstrated by Myers (1977), conflicts between shareholders 
and debtholders lead to underinvestment. Thus, the agency costs resulting from the conflicts 
of interest between shareholders and debtholders suggest that greater debt may enhance 
moral hazard behavior that can be perceived negatively by stock markets. 
 
3. An overview of the Russian financial system 
Russia’s  financial system, like most transition countries, is  bank-based.  The system was 
essentially built from scratch after the end of the Soviet Union. Prior to the 1998 crisis, 
neither banks nor the  stock market performed standard roles. Banks failed to channel 
financial resources into profitable investments, preferring instead to speculate on the 
financial markets or conduct treasury functions for their owners. Russia’s newly created 
stock market lacked transparency and legal protections for stakeholders, and boasted a very 
rudimentary infrastructure. 
Russia’s financial system finally started to develop as it recovered from the 1998 
financial crisis. Supported by a stable macroeconomic environment and major institutional 
reforms, the banking sector and financial markets began to grow. The ratio of bank assets to 
GDP doubled between 2000 and 2008, and exceeded 65% at the end of 2008. The same 
holds true for credit to private sector, which grew to 45% of GDP. While these numbers 
indicate the rapid growth of  recent years,  comparison with other countries reveals  that 
Russia still lags most developed economies and even its counterparts in the Central and 8 
 
Eastern Europe. The Russian banking system remains small in relation to the size of the 
economy. 
The most important source for financing investments of Russian companies is 
retained earnings. Unlike other countries, bank credit plays no significant role in Russia. Bank 
credit financed about 7% of investments in 2004 and only 12% in 2009 (Rosstat). Moreover, 
Russia’s little banking sector is unable to satisfy the massive financial needs of Russia’s oil, 
gas and metal producers, which today are quite integrated into the global economy.
4
Nor have companies resorted to equity issues to finance investment. Before 2006, 
only about 0.5% of investment was financed through equity issues. There were 23 equity 
issues in 2006 and 28 in 2007. Equity issues allowed companies from industries other than 
energy and finance to enter the stock  market;  about 2% of investments were financed 
through equity issues. Stock market capitalization of Russian firms nearly doubled between 
2004 and 2008. 
  
The first syndicated loans contracts in Russia were made in the mid-1990s. In many 
instances, syndicated loans were the sole financing option for large companies as these 
contracts, unlike bond issues, require no credit rating. Lenders to Russian borrowers were 
exclusively foreign financial institutions. The growth of the syndicated loans business in 
Russia came to a halt in 1998, only to restart in the early 2000s. The amount of outstanding 
syndicated loans in Russia exceeded USD 40 billion in 2005 and reached nearly USD 70 billion 
in 2007.
5
Russia’s bond market emerged in the early 2000s. The number of bond issuers began 
to snowball in 2004 as rapid economic growth boosted confidence in the Russian economy 
and firms established credit histories. The amount of corporate bonds outstanding in Russia 
increased rapidly from USD 10 billion in 2004 to almost USD 62 billion in 2008.
 Syndicated loans accounted for about a fourth of the domestic loan stock in 2007. 
6
                                                           
4 About 80% of banks are not able to provide a loan bigger than USD 10 million. The average size of the loan in 
our sample is USD 1.6 million. 
 Even with 
the increasing number of  new bond issuers, bond financing in Russia today still largely 
remains an option available only to top-tier (often state-owned) companies and banks.  
5 www.cbonds.ru. 
6 Based on the data coming from the Central Bank of Russia (www.cbr.ru). 9 
 
4. Sample and methodology 
4.1 Description of the sample 
Our data are taken from Bloomberg. We start by selecting a sample of listed Russian firms 
with reasonable track records of stock returns (at least 120 trading days per year with stock 
price information) during the observation period, 2000−2008. This yields a sample of 76 
companies. 
The  sample includes large firms, which is in line with the issuance of bonds and 
syndicated loans. Interestingly, these firms are profitable with a mean return on assets of 
9.2% and have a relatively low indebtedness with a debt-to-assets ratio of 22% and financial 
leverage of 2.55. These companies are particularly active in the following industries: basic 
materials, financial, industrial, utilities, and energy & communications. Their average stock 
return over the eight-year period equals 0.338% (the average market return
7
We next identify the debt financing event dates. They come in two types: syndicated 
loans (161 events) and bonds (160 events) leading to a total of 321 debt financing events 
over the initial full sample period. We only observe syndicated loan events up to 2004; 
thereafter both types of financing occur. The most prolific year for syndicated loan financing 
is 2005 (31 syndicated loans), and 2006 is the best year for bond issues (60). 
 during the 
same period was 0.054%) for an average volume of trading at 948.5 million shares. 
On average, bond issues are almost five times larger than syndicated loans (USD 5.5 
million compared to USD 1.6 million) with nominal rate on face value equal to 9.25% for 
bonds and a spread of 189 bps over benchmark rate (such as Libor) for loans. Bond maturity 
is four times longer than for loans (4 years compared to 0.8 years). Most loans are term 
loans (88%) and only a quarter are  secured. Companies that have issued debt have on 
average USD 95 million of outstanding debt (USD 12.3 million and USD 105 million for bonds 
and loans,  respectively) for 7.5 issues in the past (3.8 and 5.5 for bonds and loans, 
respectively). We also observe that companies issuing bonds are larger, more profitable and 
less risky in comparison to those issuing debt through syndicated loans.  
                                                           
7 Measured using the RTS (Russian Trading System) stock index. 10 
 
Finally, 41% of the companies in the full sample have issued bonds and loans at least 
once during the sample period. These companies have issued larger amounts of bonds and 
loans with longer maturities, with lower coupons and spreads, while having larger amounts 
of bonds and loans outstanding and issued more debt in the past. However, companies that 
issued bonds and loans at least once are smaller, less risky, and more profitable. 
To proceed with estimations, we need a sufficient number of observations of stock 
returns before and after the debt arrangement event, which in our case is the issuance of 
the bond or syndicated loan. Due to this restriction on data, our final, winnowed-down 




The market model, which relates the return of a given stock to the return of the market 
index, is used to estimate abnormal returns around the event date (see MacKinlay, 1997 for 
a survey).
8
Returns are defined in a standard way as [P(t)-P(t-1)]/P(t-1), where P(t) is the daily 
closing stock market price at time t. To proxy the market return the RTS stock index return is 
used.
 The event is the announcement of a debt financing arrangement (i.e. bond or 
syndicated loan). The date of announcement is taken as day 0. It is necessary to make sure 
that there is no other corporate news that could influence stock returns within an event 
window. We check it carefully and find no contamination caused by other events around our 
event dates.  
9
Following notably Lummer and McConnell (1989), Preece and Mullineaux (1996), and 
Gasbarro et al. (2004), we examine one-day [0,0], three-day [−1,+1] and five-day [−2,+2] 
 The market model parameters are estimated over the period (-100, -10). The same 
results are obtained when using longer estimation periods (150 trading days) and finishing 
the estimation period up to 30 days before the event date. 
                                                           
8 Using a constant mean model (aka “beta one” model, where the abnormal return is supposed to be equal to 
the difference between the stock return and the market return) gives virtually the same results. However, this 
methodology is more attackable  as  it relies on a stronger underlying hypothesis than  the market model. 
Indeed, the beta one model assumes that every stock has a beta equal to 1. 




We perform T-tests to investigate the statistical significance of the CAARs and 
standardized CAARs. Then, to analyze if the stock market discriminates between different 
types of debt events (loans versus bonds), we apply Student, Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis 
tests to the CAARs and standardized CAARs. 
 and calculate average abnormal standardized, as well as non-standardized, 
daily returns. The cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) are calculated by summing 
over the respective event windows. Standard OLS regressions are used to estimate the 
market model, with a satisfactory average R² equal to 15%.  
 
5. Results 
We provide the results of the event study for the stock market reaction to an external debt 
financing arrangement in a first subsection. Results for different types of debt arrangements 
(loans vs. bonds) are provided afterwards. 
5.1 Stock market reaction to debt arrangements 
We now present the results on stock market reactions to debt financing arrangement of 
Russian companies. We report the CAARs and standardized CAARs for the three event-
windows in Table 1. We observe that the percentage of positive CAARs ranges from 40 for 
the one-day  event  window to 25 for the five-day window. Nevertheless, the  CAARs are 
systematically negative for every event window and significantly different from 0. The values 
of CAARs broadly correspond to the values found in the other studies
11; the only distinction 
is our negative sign. Standardized CAARs are statistically significant for the largest event 
window. These results are confirmed when using cross sectional Patell (1976) and Boehmer 
et al. (1991) T-statistics.
12
                                                           
10 It is worth noticing that since financial markets in emerging economies are not expected to be as strongly 
efficient as in developed economies, we may expect the existence of information leakage regarding the 
issuance of bonds or loans. Thus, it is possible that abnormal returns can be realized prior to the 
announcement date. To control for this issue, we also examine two additional asymmetric four days event 
windows, i.e. [-1,2] and [-2,1]. The results we obtain are very similar to those with symmetric event windows. 
 Moreover, excluding financial firms from the sample has no effect 
on our results. 
11 For the overview of these values see Chapter 2 in Degryse, Kim and Ongena (2009). 
12 Power sample tests show that sample size is sufficient to perform t-tests and obtain robust results.  12 
 
Hence, the results support a negative stock market reaction to debt financing 
arrangements and thus the moral hazard hypothesis, i.e. stock market investors envisage 
that debt financing increases agency costs between shareholders and debtholders.
13
While this result does not comport with the conclusions of studies presented in the 
literature review, which mostly find a significant and positive stock market reaction to loan 
announcements, it should be noted that they analyze developed markets whereas we deal 
with the Russian emerging market and its intrinsic specificities. Furthermore, these studies 
mostly investigate only one type of external debt financing (loans), while we consider stock 
market reactions to a broader spectrum of debt financing (loans and bonds).  
 Indeed, 
this latter argument plays a stronger role than the signaling role of debt or the pressure on 
managers raised by issued debt. 
It is worth mentioning that a positive and significant reaction to debt financing cannot 
be generalized. For instance, Armitage (1995) finds no significant reaction to syndicated loan 
announcements in the UK. Moreover, in their recent contribution Billett et al. (2006) show 
that over the long run firms announcing bank loans suffer negative abnormal stock returns. 
Our conclusions described above are reinforced by the results of the correlation 
analysis. Indeed, CAARs are significantly and negatively correlated with most of the financial 
structure ratios such as current ratio, long term debt to common equity, total debt to 
common equity, total debt to ebitda, total debt to total capital, and financial leverage. We 
also find that measures of profitability such as return on assets, gross margin, and operating 
margin are significantly and positively correlated with CAARs. 
Overall, our results suggest  that investors in Russia do not value external debt 
financing, considering such funding a negative signal with respect to increased agency and 
moral hazard problems inside the firm. 
                                                           
13 Recall that results are mostly driven by firms that did not tap both markets, i.e. bonds and loans (46 out of 
55). 13 
 
5.2. Loan versus bond event 
Next, we investigate stock market reaction based on the type of debt financing arrangement, 
i.e. bond versus loan financing event. 
Several arguments can be advanced to support the expectations of a different reaction 
of stock markets to the type of debt. Following Altunbas et al. (2009), syndicated loans are 
expected to be perceived more positively by stock markets as the cost of loan is generally 
considered lower than the cost of bond. Furthermore, as syndicated loans are associated 
with a valuable bank monitoring, this certification effect would lead to better perception by 
stock markets. On the other hand, bonds may benefit from an enhanced perception of stock 
markets as they are seen as harder to renegotiate. It is more difficult to renegotiate with a 
multitude of bond holders than a small group of lenders. As a consequence, only borrowers 
with a low probability of financial distress would issue bonds. 
Again, we report the CAARs and standardized CAARs by type of debt for the three 
event  windows in Table 2. Results of various tests for the difference of CAARs and 
standardized CAARs are displayed in Table 3. 
We observe that the percentage of positive CAARs for bond and loan events remains 
similar and close to 40% for the shortest event window, while this percentage becomes 
much smaller for loan events as the event window widens. For instance, only 12% of CAARs 
are positive for loans in the [-2,2] event window, while more than 30% of CAARs for bonds 
remain positive. Investors seem to value more debt financing through bonds issue than 
through loans. Nevertheless, CAARs are systematically negative for every event window 
(except [0,0]), and significantly different from 0.  
Turning to the results presented in Table 3, we observe that CAARs and standardized 
CAARs are not statistically different for bonds and loans according to results of our three 
tests (Student, Wilcoxon, and Kruskal-Wallis). Hence, although significant and negative, the 
stock market reaction is about the same for bonds and loans. In other words, investors do 
not appear to distinguish between these two types of debt issued by firms,  but  rather 
consider any announcement of external debt financing to be a negative signal. 14 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate stock market reactions to debt arrangements in Russia by 
applying the event study methodology. This approach provides information on the valuation 
of debt arrangements by stock markets that further helps in understanding the use of debt 
by Russian companies. Indeed, while supply factors are usually offered to explain the lack of 
development of Russia’s financial markets, there is no reason demand factors might also 
play a role in motivating Russian companies to avoid external financing. 
Our study shows a negative reaction of stock markets to debt arrangements. This 
finding supports the view that Russian firms may be inclined to be more judicious in their use 
of debt financing arrangements than companies in developed countries. We explain this 
finding in terms of shareholder moral hazard behavior that favors expansion of debt at the 
expense of debtholders. While this conclusion differs from the general results observed in 
other studies concerning developed countries, it may imply that institutional frameworks in 
emerging countries influence stock market reactions to debt announcements. Further, we 
observe that both financing instruments, bonds and syndicated loans, are similarly perceived 
by stock markets. Therefore, possible arguments about differences in perception  are 
irrelevant in the case of Russian companies. 
The implications of these results should rivet the interest of Russia’s policy advisors. 
Given that these results indicate that the low indebtedness of Russian companies may be the 
result of demand factors rather than of supply factors, authorities seeking to encourage 
greater  use of debt by Russian companies  need to design measures based on demand 
factors rather than supply factors. In particular, there is a need to reduce the perception of 
moral hazard behavior associated with the use of debt. This could be accomplished by 
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Table 1.  Cumulative average abnormal returns for debt events 
This table displays CAARs and standardized CAARs for the selected three event windows in the second and 
third columns. The percentage of positive CAARs is in the fourth column, while the last two columns provide p-
values for t-test of CAARs significance. The sample period is June 2004 to December 2008. The number of debt 
events is 55. ***, **, and * indicate CAAR and standardized CAAR statistically different from 0 at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% confidence levels, respectively. 
Event 
window 




Prob. > |t| for 
CAAR 




-0.012*  -0.069  0.400  0.058  0.596 
[-1,1] 
 
-0.031***  -0.123  0.309  0.004  0.189 
[-2,2] 
 





Table 2.  Cumulative average abnormal returns by type of debt events (bond vs. loan) 
This table displays CAARs and standardized CAARs by type of debt event (bond vs. loan) for the selected three 
event windows in the second and third columns. The percentage of positive CAARs is in the fourth column, 
while the last two columns provide p-values for t-test of CAARs significance. The sample period is June 2004 to 
December 2008. The number of events is 38 (bonds) and 17 (loans).  ***, **, and * indicate CAAR and   









Prob. > |t| 
for CAAR 
Prob. > |t| for 
std. CAAR 
[0,0]  Bond 
 
-0.009  -0.012  0.394  0.105  0.923 
Loan 
 
-0.018  -0.197  0.411  0.270  0.542 
[-1,1]  Bond 
 
-0.031**  -0.103  0.342  0.027  0.400 
Loan 
 
-0.029*  -0.166  0.235  0.057  0.217 
[-2,2]  Bond 
 
-0.052***  -0.185  0.315  0.005  0.121 
Loan 
 




Table 3.  Difference significance tests by type of debt events (bond vs. loan) for cumulative 
average abnormal returns 
This table displays the results of Student, Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis tests for the difference of CAARs and 
standardized CAARs by type of debt event (bond vs. loan) for each of the three event windows. For the first two 
tests, the null hypothesis is that the difference of CAARs (standardized CAARs) between loan and bond events 
is null. For the Kruskal-Wallis test, the null hypothesis is that the loan and bond events samples come from 
identical populations. CAAR and standardized CAAR variances are unequal for the [0,0] event window according 
to Fisher tests, hence we use the Satterthwaite method for the Student tests. Variances are found to be equal 
for the other windows hence we use the pooled method for the tests. Student approximation gives similar 
results to normal approximation for Wilcoxon tests. The sample period is June 2004 to December 2008. The 
number of events is 38 (bonds) and 17 (loans). 
    Student test  Wilcoxon test  Kruskal-Wallis test 
Event window    T  Prob. > |t|  Z   Prob. > |Z|  Chi²  Prob. > Chi² 
[0,0]  CAAR 
 
0.54  0.594  -0.20  0.834  0.04  0.827 
  Std. CAAR 
 
0.54  0.593  0.04  0.963  0.00  0.956 
[-1,1]  CAAR 
 
-0.09  0.925  -0.11  0.905  0.01  0.898 
  Std. CAAR 
 
0.31  0.756  -0.24  0.805  0.06  0.798 
[-2,2]  CAAR 
 
0.08  0.934  -0.31  0.749  0.10  0.743 
  Std. CAAR 
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